


by totalitarian designs devised in the den of the devil himself. Enemies from abroad succeeded in delivering an unbelievable blow to this great nation. We cannot allow grungy rabble from within to finish the job." Frederick Meekins

RESISTANCE, CRISIS, TRANSFORMATION



**by Michael Hardt
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On the basic principles of *Empire* listed at the end of this zine.

3.3 - RESISTANCE, CRISIS, TRANSFORMATION

The continuity of struggle is easy: the workers need only themselves and the boss in front of them. But the continuity of organization is a rare and complex thing: as soon as it is institutionalized it quickly becomes used by capitalism, or by the workers' movement in the service of capitalism.

-Mario Tronti

The New Left sprang . . . from Elvis's gyrating pelvis.

-Jerry Rubin

Earlier we posed the Vietnam War as a deviation from the U.S. constitutional project and its tendency toward Empire. The war was also, however, an expression of the desire for freedom of the Vietnamese, an expression of peasant and proletarian subjectivity -a fundamental example of resistance against both the final forms of imperialism and the international disciplinary regime. The Vietnam War represents a real turning point in the history of contemporary capitalism insofar as the Vietnamese resistance is conceived as the symbolic center of a whole series of struggles around the world that had up until that point remained separate and distant from one another. The peasantry who were being subsumed under multinational capital, the (post)colonial proletariat, the industrial working class in the dominant capitalist countries, and the new strata of intellectual proletariat everywhere all tended toward a common site of exploitation in the factory-society of the globalized disciplinary regime. The various struggles converged against one common enemy: the international disciplinary order. An objective unity was established, sometimes with the consciousness of those in struggle and sometimes without. The long cycle of struggles against the

sovereignty, the subjectivities of the society of control have mixed constitutions."

4. The Decline and Fall of Empire

4.1 Virtualities

357 Recuperating the concept of justice in the postmodern world: "Living labor is what constructs the passageway from the virtual to the real; it is the vehicle of possibility. Labor that has broken open the cages of economic, social, and political discipline and surpassed every regulative dimension of modern capitalism along with its state-form now appears as a general social activity." But how does this living labor escape break free of the system-based subjectivization processes? After all, "no subjectivity is outside." It doesn't help me much to see that "The common actions of labor, intelligence, passion, and affect configure a constituent power...a power of freedom, ontological construction, and omnilateral dissemination."

360 "We do not think that this is really a contradiction" that subjectivities are constructed within the system and yet seem capable of responding to the system..."When the action of Empire is effective, this is due not to its own force but to the fact that it is driven by the rebound from the resistance of the multitude against imperial power..resistance is actually prior to power." This sort of statement would strike Jim McGuigan as a perfect example of what he has described as Cultural Populism, a mystification a la John Fiske of the powers of the dispersed fragmentary and often unreflective populace.

Nomadism as virtue 362.

"This propensity towards mayhem and destruction in the name of justice may metastasize into an essential characteristic of the so-called educated mind (i.e., one surrendered to the tripe propagated by the tenured polemicists of perdition). The treatise of treason and terror published by so-called "educators" Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Rockwell reports, is so popular this semester as a standard classroom text on American campuses that this rag is on six-week backorder at Harvard University Press. Already it has gained notoriety or infamy --- depending on your perspective --- as a new Communist Manifesto.

The Western World totters along the brink of a destructive revolution determined to destroy all that is good, pure, and holy to be replaced

291 the homogenization of laboring processes as a result of informatization: computerized weaving and computerized tailoring both involve on in pretty much the same operations

292....this section is increasingly sounding like John Naisbitt.

3.5 Mixed Constitution

This section explores the new juridical formations that are said to define empire.

307 All former cozy relations between state and capital are superceded by new process of supra-national politics.

308 By the same token, "the traditional idea of counter-power and the idea of resistance against modern sovereignty in general becomes less and less possible."

319 With an ambiguity akin to that which characterizes their treatment of movements of resistance, Hardt and Negri describe the new juridical formations: "infused with the full intensity of the displacements, modulation, and hybridizations involved in the passage to postmodernity"

320 Here we find a review, in very general terms, of the constitutional processes of postmodern sovereignty that, strangely and inexplicably, facilitate management from overarching hybrid forces while simultaneously opening up a "new dynamic that liberates the producing and consuming subject from the mechanisms of political subjection."

321-4 This section on spectacle is a welcome retreat from the panglossian program outlined above. Here it is recognized that power is exercised and subjectivities are formed through the mediation of spectacle which "really works through the communication of fear— or rather, the spectacle creates forms of desire and pleasure that are intimately wedded to fear." (This contention might well serve as the platform for studies of the media in popular culture, in film and in music for example.)

3.6. Capitalist Sovereignty

331 "In the passage to the society of control, the elements of transcendence of disciplinary society decline while the immanent aspects are accentuated and generalized." "The passage toward the society of control involves a production of subjectivity that is not fixed in identity but hybrid and modulating." "Just like the imperial

disciplinary regimes had reached maturity and forced capital to modify its own structures and undergo a paradigm shift.

Two, Three, Many Vietnams

In the late 1960s the international system of capitalist production was in crisis. Capitalist crisis, as Marx tells us, is a situation that requires capital to undergo a general devaluation and a profound rearrangement of the relations of production as a result of the downward pressure that the proletariat puts on the rate of profit. In other words, capitalist crisis is not simply a function of capital's own dynamics but is caused directly by proletarian conflict. This Marxian notion of crisis helps bring to light the most important features of the crisis of the late 1960s. The fall of the rate of profit and the disruption of relations of command in this period are best understood when seen as a result of the confluence and accumulation of proletarian and anticapitalist attacks against the international capitalist system.

In the dominant capitalist countries, this period witnessed a worker attack of the highest intensity directed primarily against the disciplinary regimes of capitalist labor. The attack was expressed, first of all, as a general refusal of work and specifically as a refusal of factory work. It was aimed against productivity and against any model of development based on increasing the productivity of factory labor. The refusal of the disciplinary regime and the affirmation of the sphere of non-work became the defining features of a new set of collective practices and a new form of life.[3] Second, the attack served to subvert the capitalist divisions of the labor market. The three primary characteristics of the labor market—the separation of social groups (by class strata, race, ethnicity, or sex), the fluidity of the labor market (social mobility, tertiarization, new relations between directly and indirectly productive labor, and so forth), and the hierarchies of the market of abstract labor—were all threatened by the rising rigidity and commonality of worker demands. The increasing socialization of capital led also toward the social unification of the proletariat. This increasingly unified voice posed the general demand for a guaranteed social wage and a very high level of welfare. Third, and finally, the worker attack was waged directly against capitalist command. The refusal of work and the social unification of the proletariat came together in a frontal attack against the coercive organization of social labor and the disciplinary structures of command. This worker attack was completely political—even when many mass practices, particularly of youth, seemed decidedly

apolitical-insofar as it exposed and struck the political nerve centers of the economic organization of capital. The peasant and proletarian struggles in the subordinate countries also imposed reform on local and international political regimes. Decades of revolutionary struggle—from the Chinese Revolution to Vietnam and from the Cuban Revolution to the numerous liberation struggles throughout Latin America, Africa, and the Arab world—had pushed forward a proletarian wage demand that various socialist and/or nationalist reformist regimes had to satisfy and that directly destabilized the international economic system. The ideology of modernization, even when it did not bring “development,” created new desires that exceeded the established relations of production and reproduction. The sudden increase in the costs of raw materials, energy, and certain agricultural commodities in the 1960s and 1970s was a symptom of these new desires and the rising pressure of the international proletariat on the wage. The effects of these struggles not only were a quantitative matter but also determined a qualitatively new element that profoundly marked the intensity of the crisis. For more than one hundred years the practices of imperialism had worked to subsume all forms of production throughout the world under the command of capital, and that tendency was only intensified in this period of transition. The tendency created necessarily a potential or virtual unity of the international proletariat. This virtual unity was never fully actualized as a global political unity, but it nonetheless had substantial effects. In other words, the few instances of the actual and conscious international organization of labor are not what seem most important here, but rather the objective coincidence of struggles that overlap precisely because, despite their radical diversity, they were all directed against the international disciplinary regime of capital. The growing coincidence determined what we call an accumulation of struggles.

This accumulation of struggles undermined the capitalist strategy that had long relied on the hierarchies of the international divisions of labor to block any global unity among workers. Already in the nineteenth century, before European imperialism had fully bloomed, Engels was bemoaning the fact that the English proletariat was put in the position of a “labor aristocracy” because its interests lay with the project of British imperialism rather than with the ranks of colonial labor power. In the period of the decline of imperialisms, strong international divisions of labor certainly remained, but the imperialist advantages of any national working class had begun to wither away. The common struggles of the proletariat in the subordinate countries took away the possibility of the old imperialist strategy of transferring the crisis from the metropolitan terrain to its subordinate territories. It

255). “increasingly it subsumes not the noncapitalist environment but its own capitalist terrain—that is, that the subsumption is no longer formal but real. Capital no longer looks outside but rather inside its domain, and its expansion is thus intensive rather than extensive.” (What does this vague concepts mean?) Essentially that the raw materials that feed mechanized production are themselves mechanically produced.

273 He claims that “the universalization of discipline in both the dominant and the subordinate countries (in the 1960s and 1970s) created a new margin of freedom for the laboring multitude... that forced a change in the quality and nature of labor itself.” How did this change come about in detail. Who, when, by what mechanisms? “The refusal of the disciplinary regime of the social factory was accompanied by a reevaluation of the social value of the entire set of productive activities. The disciplinary regime clearly no longer succeeded in containing the needs and desires of young people.” (PATCO?)

274 “The movements values instead a more flexible dynamic of creativity...”
(This vague discussion of tactics of resistance sounds increasingly similar to those offered by James Scott).

3.4 Postmodernization or the Informatization of Production

Developmental theory was based on the imagined but false possibility of economic self-isolation by developing countries.

Assumptions of wholesale transformation of modern society by reason of the operations of the overarching market:

285 “The processes of becoming human and the nature of the human itself were fundamentally transformed in the passage defined by modernization.”

Debunking the idea that the shifts towards postmodernization involve the creation of economic stages “whereby the dominant countries are information service economies, their first subordinates are industrial economies, and those further subordinated are agricultural.” (287)

Features of postmodernized production: Toyotism (290)... “just in time production,” something that has already been realized on a broad scale in the publishing industry (personal observation).
Post-mechanical humans: “Interactive and cybernetic machines become a new prosthesis integrated into our bodies and minds and a lens through which to redefine our bodies and minds themselves. The anthropology of cyberspace is really a recognition of the new human condition.”

disciplinary model...this enormous new subjectivity alluded to and made necessary a paradigm shift."

The subjective processes discussed here are interesting, but controversial:

253 "The peasants who become wage workers...are (not necessarily) more free than the traditional territorialized laborer, but they do become infused with a new desire for liberation." ...
Transversal mobility "more rhizomatic than arborescent...nomadic desires that cannot be contained and controlled within the disciplinary regime. ...

255 Marx's concept of formal subsumption is herewith replaced by a process of real subsumption:
"The realization of the world market and the general equalization or at least management of rates of profit on a world scale cannot be the result simply of financial or monetary factors but must come about through a transformation of social and productive relations. Discipline is the central mechanism of this transformation. When a new social reality is formed, integrating both the development of capital and the proletarianization of the population into a single process, the political form of command must itself be modified and articulated in a manner and on a scale adequate to this process, a global quasi-state of the disciplinary regime."

3.3 Resistance Crisis Transformation

Against Third Worldism as a way of conceiving movements of opposition and resistance.

268 axiom: "The proletariat actually invents the social and productive forms that capital will be forced to adopt in the future" hmmm!
"Working-class power resides not in the representative institutions but in the antagonism and autonomy of the workers themselves."
(Rorty will not like this last statement one bit.) And now to bring the argument to a QED, "Capital had to confront and respond to the new production of subjectivity of the proletariat. "

272 Why is capitalism at the end of the 20th century still curiously healthy? The answer is not so much that it is not imperialist any longer or that it has not yet consumed all the "other" resources and markets that are available to feed its hunger, but that it has been transformed: the key is again the notion of real subsumption (see p.

was no longer feasible to rely on Cecil Rhodes's old strategy of placating the domestic dangers of class struggle in Europe by shifting the economic pressures to the still peaceful order of the dominated imperialist terrain maintained with brutally effective techniques. The proletariat formed on the imperialist terrain was now itself organized, armed, and dangerous. There was thus a tendency toward the unity of the international or multinational proletariat in one common attack against the capitalist disciplinary regime. The resistance and initiative of the proletariat in the subordinate countries resonated as a symbol and model both above and within the proletariat of the dominant capitalist countries. By virtue of this convergence, the worker struggles throughout the domain of international capital already decreed the end of the division between First and Third Worlds and the potential political integration of the entire global proletariat. The convergence of struggles posed on an international scale the problem of transforming laboring cooperation into revolutionary organization and actualizing the virtual political unity. With this objective convergence and accumulation of struggles, Third Worldist perspectives, which may earlier have had a limited utility, were now completely useless. We understand Third Worldism to be defined by the notion that the primary contradiction and antagonism of the international capitalist system is between the capital of the First World and the labor of the Third. The potential for revolution thus resides squarely and exclusively in the Third World. This view has been evoked implicitly and explicitly in a variety of dependency theories, theories of underdevelopment, and world system perspectives. The limited merit of the Third Worldist perspective was that it directly countered the "First Worldist" or Eurocentric view that innovation and change have always originated, and can only originate, in Euro-America. Its specular opposition of this false claim, however, leads only to a position that is equally false. We find this Third Worldist perspective inadequate because it ignores the innovations and antagonisms of labor in the First and Second Worlds. Furthermore, and most important for our argument here, the Third Worldist perspective is blind to the real convergence of struggles across the world, in the dominant and subordinate countries alike.

Capitalist Response to the Crisis

As the global confluence of struggles undermined the capitalist and imperialist capacities of discipline, the economic order that had dominated the globe for almost thirty years, the Golden Age of U.S. hegemony and capitalist growth, began to unravel. The form and substance of the capitalist management of international development

for the postwar period were dictated at the conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. The Bretton Woods system was based on three fundamental elements. Its first characteristic was the comprehensive economic hegemony of the United States over all the nonsocialist countries. This hegemony was secured through the strategic choice of a liberal development based on relatively free trade and moreover by maintaining gold (of which the United States possessed about one third of the world total) as the guarantee of the power of the dollar. The dollar was "as good as gold." Second, the system demanded the agreement for monetary stabilization between the United States and the other dominant capitalist countries (first Europe then Japan) over the traditional territories of European imperialisms, which had been dominated previously by the British pound and the French franc. Reform in the dominant capitalist countries could thus be financed by a surplus of exports to the United States and guaranteed by the monetary system of the dollar. Finally, Bretton Woods dictated the establishment of a quasi-imperialist relationship of the United States over all the subordinate nonsocialist countries. Economic development within the United States and stabilization and reform in Europe and Japan were all guaranteed by the United States insofar as it accumulated imperialist superprofits through its relationship to the subordinate countries.

The system of U.S. monetary hegemony was a fundamentally new arrangement because, whereas the control of previous international monetary systems (notably the British) had been firmly in the hands of private bankers and financiers, Bretton Woods gave control to a series of governmental and regulatory organizations, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and ultimately the U.S. Federal Reserve.[9] Bretton Woods might thus be understood as the monetary and financial face of the hegemony of the New Deal model over the global capitalist economy. The Keynesian and pseudo-imperialist mechanisms of Bretton Woods eventually went into crisis when the continuity of the workers' struggles in the United States, Europe, and Japan raised the costs of stabilization and reformism, and when anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggles in subordinate countries began to undermine the extraction of superprofits. When the imperialist motor could no longer move forward and the workers' struggles become ever more demanding, the U.S. trade balance began to lean heavily in the direction of Europe and Japan. A first phase of crisis-creeping rather than rampant-extended from the early to the late 1960s. Since the controls provided by Bretton Woods made the dollar de facto inconvertible, the monetary mediation of international production and trade developed through a phase characterized by the relatively free circulation of capital, the

201 In this summary section, Hardt and Negri refer to "immanence" as a "plane of forces of the desire and cooperation of the multitude." This is quite a different—though still related—characterization that they offered in the early pages of the book where immanence was linked to the gnostic-spirited recognition that spirit and power are incarnated in persons.

207 "We have thus arrived at a series of distinctions that conceptually mark the passage from modern to imperial sovereignty: from the people to the multitude, from dialectical opposition to the management of hybridities, from the place of modern sovereignty to the non-place of Empire, from crisis to corruption." (They argue that the penchant for distinctions runs against the grain of postmodern borderless freeplay. Hmm.)

207-18 Intercalated comments on opposition, resistance and refusal to imperial domination.

Part III Passages of Production

3.1 The Limits of Imperialism

221-39 Basic Marxian axioms regarding the value surplus and the unquenchable thirst for new market frontiers that is endemic to capitalism.

242 "The New Deal model was the first instance of a strong subjectivity that tended in the direction of Empire. The New Deal produced the highest form of disciplinary government."

245 The model was advanced by three post-war processes: decolonization, the decentralization of production, and the construction of a framework of international relations ("transforming the massive popular mobilization for liberation into a mobilization for production").

248 Taylorism (F. W. Taylor) as the launch pad for the disciplinary project

249 (More significant than the cold war), "the gigantic postcolonial transformation of the Third World under the guise of modernization and development."...

250 "Behind the facade of the bipolar U.S.-Soviet divide...a single

They do make the point however, that the openness of American frontiers and the vitality of American industrial production were integral and crucial features of its break through.

172 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, American liberty, its new model of network power, and its alternative conception to modern sovereignty all ran up against the recognition that open terrain was limited. The development of the U.S. Constitution would be from this moment on constantly poised on a contradictory border.

182 The contemporary idea of Empire is born through the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project. It is in fact through the extension of internal constitution processes that we enter into a constituent process of Empire.

2.6 Imperial Sovereignty

This section deals with the exercise of power in Empire, taking particular note of the new condition of borderlessness...

187 "In the passage from modern to postmodern and from imperialism to Empire there is progressively less distinction between inside and outside." (Interesting aside on the role of the discipline of anthropology in creating borders for modern sovereignty: "Modern anthropology's various discourses on primitive societies function as the outside that defines the bounds of the civil world. The process of modernization is the internalization of the outside, that is, the civilization of nature.")

191 The end of racism narrowly defined by physical traits....the beginning of new forms of culture-based racism

On the generation of subjectivity:

Modern societies were said to facilitate individuals' construction of subjectivities within institutional spaces. In the postmodern, subjectivities continue to be constructed, indeed, "in an ever more intense way" (p. 196), but the process is not longer restricted to institutional spaces, the bordering of such spaces having been thrown into crisis.

198 Characterizing imperial sovereignty in three moments: inclusive, differential and managerial...initially empire welcomes all, then it actively distinguishes diverse people, then it manages their diversity opportunistically to serve the needs of production.

construction of a strong Eurodollar market, and the fixing of political parity more or less everywhere in the dominant countries. The explosion of 1968 in Europe, the United States, and Japan, coupled with the Vietnamese military victory over the United States, however, completely dissolved this provisory stabilization. Stagnation gave way to rampant inflation. The second phase of the crisis might be thought of as beginning on August 17, 1971, when President Nixon decoupled the dollar from the gold standard, making the dollar inconvertible de jure and adding a 10 percent surcharge to all imports from Europe to the United States.[12] The entire U.S. debt was effectively pushed onto Europe. This operation was accomplished only by virtue of the economic and political power of the United States, which thus reminded the Europeans of the initial terms of the agreement, of its hegemony as the highest point of exploitation and capitalist command.

In the 1970s the crisis became official and structural. The system of political and economic equilibria invented at Bretton Woods had been completely thrown into disarray, and what remained was only the brute fact of U.S. hegemony. The declining effectiveness of the Bretton Woods mechanisms and the decomposition of the monetary system of Fordism in the dominant countries made it clear that the reconstruction of an international system of capital would have to involve a comprehensive restructuring of economic relations and a paradigm shift in the definition of world command. Such a crisis, however, is not always an entirely negative or unwelcome event from the perspective of capital. Marx claims that capital does indeed have a fundamental interest in economic crisis for its transformative power. With respect to the overall system, individual capitalists are conservative. They are focused primarily on maximizing their individual profits in the short term even when this leads down a ruinous path for collective capital in the long term. Economic crisis can overcome these resistances, destroy unprofitable sectors, restructure the organization of production, and renew its technologies. In other words, economic crisis can push forward a transformation that reestablishes a high general rate of profit, thus responding effectively on the very terrain defined by the worker attack. Capital's general devaluation and its efforts to destroy worker organization serve to transform the substance of the crisis—the disequilibria of circulation and overproduction—into a reorganized apparatus of command that rearticulates the relationship between development and exploitation.

Given the intensity and coherence of the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, two paths were open to capital for accomplishing the tasks of

placating the struggles and restructuring command, and it tried each of them in turn. The first path, which had only a limited effectiveness, was the repressive option—a fundamentally conservative operation. Capital's repressive strategy was aimed at completely reversing the social process, separating and disaggregating the labor market, and reestablishing control over the entire cycle of production. Capital thus privileged the organizations that represented a guaranteed wage for a limited portion of the work force, fixing that segment of the population within their structures and reinforcing the separation between those workers and more marginalized populations. The reconstruction of a system of hierarchical compartmentalization, both within each nation and internationally, was accomplished by controlling social mobility and fluidity. The repressive use of technology, including the automation and computerization of production, was a central weapon wielded in this effort. The previous fundamental technological transformation in the history of capitalist production (that is, the introduction of the assembly line and the mass manufacturing regime) involved crucial modifications of the immediate productive processes (Taylorism) and an enormous step forward in the regulation of the social cycle of reproduction (Fordism). The technological transformations of the 1970s, however, with their thrust toward automatic rationalization, pushed these regimes to the extreme limit of their effectiveness, to the breaking point. Taylorist and Fordist mechanisms could no longer control the dynamic of productive and social forces.[13] Repression exercised through the old framework of control could perhaps keep a lid on the destructive powers of the crisis and the fury of the worker attack, but it was ultimately also a self-destructive response that would suffocate capitalist production itself. At the same time, then, a second path had to come into play, one that would involve a technological transformation aimed no longer only at repression but rather at changing the very composition of the proletariat, and thus integrating, dominating, and profiting from its new practices and forms. In order to understand the emergence of this second path of capitalist response to the crisis, however, the path that constitutes a paradigm shift, we have to look beyond the immediate logic of capitalist strategy and planning. The history of capitalist forms is always necessarily a reactive history: left to its own devices capital would never abandon a regime of profit. In other words, capitalism undergoes systemic transformation only when it is forced to and when its current regime is no longer tenable. In order to grasp the process from the perspective of its active element, we need to adopt the standpoint of the other side—that is, the standpoint of the proletariat along with that of the remaining noncapitalist world that is progressively being drawn into capitalist relations. The power of the

2.4 Symptoms of Passage

138 postmodern theories are important effects that reflect the expansion of the world market and the passage of the form of sovereignty.

139 "The world of modern sovereignty is a Manichean world, divided by a series of binary oppositions that define Self and Other, white and black, inside and outside, ruler and ruled (and male and female?). Postmodernist thought challenges precisely this binary logic of modernity and in this respect provides important resources for those who are struggling to challenge modern discourses of patriarchy, colonialism and racism." [For an alternative, middle-way take on Manichean culturalism and the postmodernist's freeplay, see Terry Eagleton's comments in *The Concept of Culture*: "Cultures 'work' exactly because they are porous, fuzzy-edged, indeterminate, intrinsically inconsistent, never quite identical with themselves,, their boundaries continually modulating into horizons." (P. 96).]

140 Modernism is defined by two features: immanence and dualism. Postmodern theories attack only the second of these. This contention is supported by a close reading of Homi Bhabha's writings on p. 143-6.

149 Fundamentalism: "The anti-modern thrust that defines fundamentalism might be better understood not as a premodern but as a postmodern project.....refusal of modernity as a weapon of Euro-American hegemony.... The Iranian revolution was a powerful rejection of the world market...we might think of it as the first postmodernist revolution."...

The Ideology of the World Market

150 "As the world market today is realized ever more completely it tends to deconstruct the boundaries of the nation-state." This effect is one of the major symptoms of Empire, that is, the of national boundaries.

2.5 Network Power

The argument here is that the American Revolution and the U.S. Constitution initiated a rupture of modern sovereignty by way of its system of checks and balances of power which made it possible for power to be at once of the people (rather than over the people) and therefore immanent to a greater degree than any other modern state to that point.

and also of I. Berlin's comments on the "apotheosis of will," in *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*.)

Sovereignty and the invisible hand (think here of Christopher Herbert in *Culture and Anomie* who sees Smith's invisible hand as the benign workings of habit and of the kindred irrational forces that are officially denounced.)

The reduction of all value to one measure (think here of Michael Walser's discussion of the dictatorship of monetary value in *Spheres of Justice*).

88 Modernity replaced the traditional transcendence of command by the transcendence of the ordering function, of bureaucracy, of administration, of rational planning, of Robert's Rules and rational practice (along the lines of Shapin and Shaffer's analysis of Hobbes & Boyle, in *The Leviathan and the Air Pump*).

2.2 The Sovereignty of the Nation State

109 The totalitarianism of the nation state....let no one mourn the decline and fall of nationalism.

2.3 The Dialectics of Colonial Sovereignty

114 "Whereas within its domain the nation-state and its attendant ideological structures work tirelessly to create and reproduce the purity of the people, on the outside the nation-state is a machine that produces Others, creates racial difference, and raises boundaries that delimit and support the modern subject of sovereignty."

115 Reference to "the dark Other" of the European Enlightenment, puts me in mind of Mark Edmundson's reflections on the gothic in *Nightmare on Main St.*

115 Nation and Other and the complicity of Anthropology

127 Other as verso of nation....(Mark Edmundson and the Gothic). "Knowing, seeing, and even touching the colonized is essential (for nation formation) (Deborah Root). (What of the role of our social performances in reinforcing the Manichean logic of this operation (ET, Star Wars, Matrix, Fifth Element, Lord of the Rings)

133 lament for subaltern nationalist movements...a perverse trace

proletariat imposes limits on capital and not only determines the crisis but also dictates the terms and nature of the transformation. The proletariat actually invents the social and productive forms that capital will be forced to adopt in the future. We can get a first hint of this determinant role of the proletariat by asking ourselves how throughout the crisis the United States was able to maintain its hegemony. The answer lies in large part, perhaps paradoxically, not in the genius of U.S. politicians or capitalists, but in the power and creativity of the U.S. proletariat. Whereas earlier, from another perspective, we posed the Vietnamese resistance as the symbolic center of the struggles, now, in terms of the paradigm shift of international capitalist command, the U.S. proletariat appears as the subjective figure that expressed most fully the desires and needs of international or multinational workers. Against the common wisdom that the U.S. proletariat is weak because of its low party and union representation with respect to Europe and elsewhere, perhaps we should see it as strong for precisely those reasons. Working-class power resides not in the representative institutions but in the antagonism and autonomy of the workers themselves. This is what marked the real power of the U.S. industrial working class. Moreover, the creativity and conflictuality of the proletariat resided also, and perhaps more important, in the laboring populations outside the factories. Even (and especially) those who actively refused work posed serious threats and creative alternatives. In order to understand the continuation of U.S. hegemony, then, it is not sufficient to cite the relations of force that U.S. capitalism wielded over the capitalists in other countries. U.S. hegemony was actually sustained by the antagonistic power of the U.S. proletariat.

The new hegemony that seemed to remain in the hands of the United States was still limited at this point, closed within the old mechanisms of disciplinary restructuring. A paradigm shift was needed to design the restructuring process along the lines of the political and technological shift. In other words, capital had to confront and respond to the new production of subjectivity of the proletariat. This new production of subjectivity reached (beyond the struggle over welfare, which we have already mentioned) what might be called an ecological struggle, a struggle over the mode of life, that was eventually expressed in the developments of immaterial labor.

The Ecology of Capital

We are still not yet in a position to understand the nature of the second path of capital's response to the crisis, the paradigm shift

that will move it beyond the logics and practices of disciplinary modernization. We need to step back once again and examine the limitations imposed on capital by the international proletariat and the noncapitalist environment that both made the transformation necessary and dictated its terms.

At the time of the First World War it seemed to many observers, and particularly to the Marxist theorists of imperialism, that the death knell had sounded and capital had reached the threshold of a fatal disaster. Capitalism had pursued decades-long crusades of expansion, used up significant portions of the globe for its accumulation, and for the first time been forced to confront the limits of its frontiers. As these limits approached, imperialist powers inevitably found themselves in mortal conflict with one another. Capital depended on its outside, as Rosa Luxemburg said, on its noncapitalist environment, in order to realize and capitalize its surplus value and thus continue its cycles of accumulation. In the early twentieth century it appeared that the imperialist adventures of capitalist accumulation would soon deplete the surrounding noncapitalist nature and capital would starve to death. Everything outside the capitalist relation—be it human, animal, vegetable, or mineral—was seen from the perspective of capital and its expansion as nature. The critique of capitalist imperialism thus expressed an ecological consciousness—ecological precisely insofar as it recognized the real limits of nature and the catastrophic consequences of its destruction.

Well, as we write this book and the twentieth century draws to a close, capitalism is miraculously healthy, its accumulation more robust than ever. How can we reconcile this fact with the careful analyses of numerous Marxist authors at the beginning of the century who pointed to the imperialist conflicts as symptoms of an impending ecological disaster running up against the limits of nature? There are three ways we might approach this mystery of capital's continuing health. First, some claim that capital is no longer imperialist, that it has reformed, turned back the clock to its salad days of free competition, and developed a conservationist, ecological relationship with its noncapitalist environment. Even if theorists from Marx to Luxemburg had not demonstrated that such a process runs counter to the essence of capitalist accumulation itself, merely a cursory glance at contemporary global political economy should persuade anyone to dismiss this explanation out of hand. It is quite clear that capitalist expansion continued at an increasing pace in the latter half of the twentieth century, opening new territories to

values mediated by "high cultural" literature: "timeless unity of the human spirit, of the superiority of the imaginative to the actual, of the inferiority of ideas to feelings, of the truth that the individual stands at the center of the universe, of the relative unimportance of public and as against interpersonal life, and of the practical as against the contemplative, and other such modern prejudices." (Eagleton, *The Concept of Culture*, p. 52). "Like all the most effective forms of power, high culture presents itself simply as a form of moral persuasion." (Ibid., p. 54)

39 The sovereignty of Empire itself is realized at the margins, where borders are flexible and identities are hybrid and fluid. It would be difficult to say which is more important to Empire, the center or the margins. In fact, center and margin seem continually to be shifting positions, fleeing any determinate locations. We could even say that the process itself is virtual and that its power resides in the power of the virtual. This is a vague but appealing proposal that I am unable to evaluate.

40 the new globalized biopolitical machine

1.3 Alternatives Within Empire

43 Although Empire may have played a role in putting an end to colonialism and imperialism, it nonetheless constructs its own relationships of power based on exploitation that are in many respects more brutal than those it destroyed. The end of the dialectic of modernity has not resulted in the end of the dialectic of exploitation.

Part II Passages of Sovereignty

2.1 Two Europes

Gnosticism and immanence in early modern cultural/political life...crisis of modernity: revolutionary but "oppose the reappropriation of power on the part of the multitude," i.e. hegemonic...

76 Modernity itself is defined by crisis, a crisis that is born of the uninterrupted conflict between the immanent, constructive, creative forces and the transcendent power aimed at restoring order. Transcendent Power: Kant and the subject (This discussion puts me in mind of M. Harrington's fearful reflections on the impact of "immanence" on political processes in *The Politics at God's Funeral*,

the system, but they were employed too late and too timidly to stop the crisis. The Soviet machine turned in on itself and ground to a halt, without the fuel that only new productive subjectivities can produce. The sectors of intellectual and immaterial labor withdrew their consensus from the regime, and their exodus condemned the system to death: death from the socialist victory of modernization, death from the incapacity to use its effects and surpluses, death from a definitive asphyxia that strangled the subjective conditions which demanded a passage to postmodernity.

Empire Outline

I The Political Constitution of the Present

1.1. World Order

1.2 Biopolitical Production

27 biopolitics....Foucault..

29 The central role previously occupied by the labor power of mass factory workers in the production of surplus value is today increasingly filled by intellectual, immaterial, and communicative labor power.

32 One site where we should locate the biopolitical production of order is in the immaterial nexuses of the production of language, communication, and the symbolic that are developed by the communications industries. ...

33 The legitimization of the imperial machine is born at least in part of the communications industries, that is, of the transformation of the new mode of production into a machine. (E.g. www)

35 legitimate force...interventions...NGOs:

The NGOs demonstration of the new order as a peaceful biopolitical context seems to have blinded these theorists to the brutal effects that moral intervention produces as a prefiguration of world order.

The new order is undergirded by a powerful and unified moral climate. Hardt & Negri are not alone in making this claim. See for example Terry Eagleton's comments on the influence of the universal

the capitalist market and subsuming noncapitalist productive processes under the rule of capital.

A second hypothesis might be that the unforeseen persistence of capitalism involves simply a continuation of the same processes of expansion and accumulation that we analyzed earlier, only that the complete depletion of the environment was not yet imminent, and that the moment of confronting limits and of ecological disaster is still to come. The global resources of the noncapitalist environment have indeed proved to be vast. Although the so-called Green Revolution has subsumed within capitalism a large portion of the world's noncapitalist agriculture, and other modernization projects have incorporated new territories and civilizations into the cycle of capitalist accumulation, there still remain enormous (if, of course, limited) basins of labor power and material resources to be subsumed in capitalist production and potential sites for expanding markets. For example, the collapse of the socialist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, along with the opening of the Chinese economy in the post-Mao era, has provided global capital access to huge territories of noncapitalist environment-prefabricated for capitalist subsumption by years of socialist modernization. Even in regions already securely integrated into the world capitalist system, there are still ample opportunities for expansion. In other words, according to this second hypothesis, noncapitalist environments continue to be subsumed formally under capital's domain, and thus accumulation can still function at least in part through this formal subsumption: the prophets of capital's imminent doom were not wrong but merely spoke too early. The limitations of the noncapitalist environment, however, are real. Sooner or later the once abundant resources of nature will run out.

A third hypothesis, which may be seen as complementary to the second, is that today capital continues to accumulate through subsumption in a cycle of expanded reproduction, but that increasingly it subsumes not the noncapitalist environment but its own capitalist terrain-that is, that the subsumption is no longer formal but real. Capital no longer looks outside but rather inside its domain, and its expansion is thus intensive rather than extensive. This passage centers on a qualitative leap in the technological organization of capital. Previous stages of the industrial revolution introduced machine-made consumer goods and then machine-made machines, but now we find ourselves confronted with machine-made raw materials and foodstuffs-in short, machine-made nature and machine-made culture. We might say, then, following Fredric Jameson, that postmodernization is the economic process that

emerges when mechanical and industrial technologies have expanded to invest the entire world, when the modernization process is complete, and when the formal subsumption of the noncapitalist environment has reached its limit. Through the processes of modern technological transformation, all of nature has become capital, or at least has become subject to capital. Whereas modern accumulation is based on the formal subsumption of the noncapitalist environment, postmodern accumulation relies on the real subsumption of the capitalist terrain itself. This seems to be the real capitalist response to the threat of “ecological disaster,” a response that looks to the future. The completion of the industrialization of society and nature, however, the completion of modernization, poses only the precondition for the passage to postmodernization and grasps the transformation only in negative terms, as post-. In the next section we will confront directly the real processes of postmodernization, or the informatization of production.

Assault on the Disciplinary Regime

To understand this passage more deeply, we have to touch somehow on its determinant foundation, which resides in the subjective transformations of labor power. In the period of crisis, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the expansion of welfare and the universalization of discipline in both the dominant and the subordinate countries created a new margin of freedom for the laboring multitude. In other words, workers made use of the disciplinary era, and above all its moments of dissent and its phases of political destabilization (such as the period of the Vietnam crisis), in order to expand the social powers of labor, increase the value of labor power, and redesign the set of needs and desires to which the wage and welfare had to respond. In Marx’s terminology, one would say that the value of necessary labor had risen enormously-and of course most important from the perspective of capital, as necessary labor time increases, surplus labor time (and hence profit) decreases correspondingly. From the standpoint of the capitalist, the value of necessary labor appears as an objective economic quantity-the price of labor power, like the price of grain, oil, and other commodities- but really it is determined socially and is the index of a whole series of social struggles. The definition of the set of social needs, the quality of the time of non-work, the organization of family relationships, the accepted expectations of life are all in play and effectively represented by the costs of reproducing the worker. The enormous rise in the social wage (in terms of both working wages and welfare)

crisis was produced and reproduced in the Soviet Union, to the point finally of burying the regime.

Resistance to the bureaucratic dictatorship is what drove the crisis. The Soviet proletariat’s refusal of work was in fact the very same method of struggle that the proletariat in the capitalist countries deployed, forcing their governments into a cycle of crisis, reform, and restructuring. This is our point: despite the delays of development of Russian capitalism, despite the massive losses in World War II, despite the relative cultural isolation, the relative exclusion from the world market, the cruel policies of imprisonment, starvation, and murder of the population, despite all this, and despite their enormous differences with the dominant capitalist countries, the proletariat in Russia and the other countries of the Soviet bloc managed by the 1960s and 1970s to pose the very same problems as the proletariat in the capitalist countries. Even in Russia and the other countries under Soviet control, the demand for higher wages and greater freedom grew continuously along with the rhythm of modernization. And just as in the capitalist countries, there was defined a new figure of labor power, which now expressed enormous productive capacities on the basis of a new development of the intellectual powers of production. This new productive reality, this living intellectual multitude, is what the Soviet leaders tried to lock in the cages of a disciplinary war economy (a war that was continually conjured up rhetorically) and corral in the structures of a socialist ideology of labor and economic development, that is, a socialist management of capital that no longer made any sense. The Soviet bureaucracy was not able to construct the armory necessary for the postmodern mobilization of the new labor power. It was frightened by it, terrorized by the collapse of disciplinary regimes, by the transformations of the Taylorized and Fordist subjects that had previously animated production. This was the point where the crisis became irreversible and, given the immobility of the Brezhnevian hibernation, catastrophic.

What we find important was not so much the lack of or the offenses against the individual and formal freedoms of workers, but rather the waste of the productive energy of a multitude that had exhausted the potential of modernity and now wanted to be liberated from the socialist management of capitalist accumulation in order to express a higher level of productivity. This repression and this energy were the forces that, from opposite sides, made the Soviet world collapse like a house of cards. Glasnost and perestroika certainly did represent a self-criticism of Soviet power and posed the necessity of a democratic passage as the condition for a renewed productivity of

productive apparatus to the changes of labor power exacerbated the difficulties of the transformation. The heavy bureaucracy of the Soviet state, inherited from a long period of intense modernization, placed Soviet power in an impossible position when it had to react to the new demands and desires that the globally emerging subjectivities expressed, first within the process of modernization and then at its outer limits.

The challenge of postmodernity was posed primarily not by the enemy powers but by the new subjectivity of labor power and its new intellectual and communicative composition. The regime, particularly in its illiberal aspects, was unable to respond adequately to these subjective demands. The system could have continued, and for a certain period did continue, to work on the basis of the model of disciplinary modernization, but it could not combine modernization with the new mobility and creativity of labor power, the fundamental conditions for breathing life into the new paradigm and its complex mechanisms. In the context of Star Wars, the nuclear arms race, and space exploration, the Soviet Union may still have been able to keep up with its adversaries from the technological and military point of view, but the system could not manage to sustain the competitive conflict on the subjective front. It could not compete, in other words, precisely where the real power conflicts were being played out, and it could not face the challenges of the comparative productivity of economic systems, because advanced technologies of communication and cybernetics are efficient only when they are rooted in subjectivity, or better, when they are animated by productive subjectivities. For the Soviet regime, managing the power of the new subjectivities was a matter of life and death.

According to our thesis, then, after the dramatic final years of Stalin's rule and Khrushchev's abortive innovations, Brezhnev's regime imposed a freeze on a productive civil society that had reached a high level of maturity and that, after the enormous mobilizations for war and productivity, was asking for social and political recognition. In the capitalist world, the massive cold war propaganda and the extraordinary ideological machine of falsification and misinformation prevented us from seeing the real developments in Soviet society and the political dialectics that unfolded there. Cold war ideology called that society totalitarian, but in fact it was a society criss-crossed by extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom, just as strong as the rhythms of economic development and cultural modernization. The Soviet Union was better understood not as a totalitarian society but rather as a bureaucratic dictatorship. And only if we leave these distorted definitions behind can we see how political

during the period of crisis in the 1960s and 1970s resulted directly from the accumulation of social struggles on the terrain of reproduction, the terrain of non-work, the terrain of life.

The social struggles not only raised the costs of reproduction and the social wage (hence decreasing the rate of profit), but also and more important forced a change in the quality and nature of labor itself. Particularly in the dominant capitalist countries, where the margin of freedom afforded to and won by workers was greatest, the refusal of the disciplinary regime of the social factory was accompanied by a reevaluation of the social value of the entire set of productive activities. The disciplinary regime clearly no longer succeeded in containing the needs and desires of young people. The prospect of getting a job that guarantees regular and stable work for eight hours a day, fifty weeks a year, for an entire working life, the prospect of entering the normalized regime of the social factory, which had been a dream for many of their parents, now appeared as a kind of death. The mass refusal of the disciplinary regime, which took a variety of forms, was not only a negative expression but also a moment of creation, what Nietzsche calls a transvaluation of values.

The various forms of social contestation and experimentation all centered on a refusal to value the kind of fixed program of material production typical of the disciplinary regime, its mass factories, and its nuclear family structure. The movements valued instead a more flexible dynamic of creativity and what might be considered more immaterial forms of production. From the standpoint of the traditional "political" segments of the U.S. movements of the 1960s, the various forms of cultural experimentation that blossomed with a vengeance during that period all appeared as a kind of distraction from the "real" political and economic struggles, but what they failed to see was that the "merely cultural" experimentation had very profound political and economic effects.

"Dropping out" was really a poor conception of what was going on in Haight-Ashbury and across the United States in the 1960s. The two essential operations were the refusal of the disciplinary regime and the experimentation with new forms of productivity. The refusal appeared in a wide variety of guises and proliferated in thousands of daily practices. It was the college student who experimented with LSD instead of looking for a job; it was the young woman who refused to get married and make a family; it was the "shiftless" African-American worker who moved on "CP" (colored people's) time, refusing work in every way possible. The youth who refused the

deadening repetition of the factory-society invented new forms of mobility and flexibility, new styles of living. Student movements forced a high social value to be accorded to knowledge and intellectual labor. Feminist movements that made clear the political content of "personal" relationships and refused patriarchal discipline raised the social value of what has traditionally been considered women's work, which involves a high content of affective or caring labor and centers on services necessary for social reproduction. The entire panoply of movements and the entire emerging counterculture highlighted the social value of cooperation and communication. This massive transvaluation of the values of social production and production of new subjectivities opened the way for a powerful transformation of labor power. In the next section we will see in detail how the indexes of the value of the movements—mobility, flexibility, knowledge, communication, cooperation, the affective—would define the transformation of capitalist production in the subsequent decades.

The various analyses of "new social movements" have done a great service in insisting on the political importance of cultural movements against narrowly economic perspectives that minimize their significance. These analyses, however, are extremely limited themselves because, just like the perspectives they oppose, they perpetuate narrow understandings of the economic and the cultural. Most important, they fail to recognize the profound economic power of the cultural movements, or really the increasing indistinguishability of economic and cultural phenomena. On the one hand, capitalist relations were expanding to subsume all aspects of social production and reproduction, the entire realm of life; and on the other hand, cultural relations were redefining production processes and economic structures of value. A regime of production, and above all a regime of the production of subjectivity, was being destroyed and another invented by the enormous accumulation of struggles.

These new circuits of the production of subjectivity, which were centered on the dramatic modifications of value and labor, were realized within and against the final period of the disciplinary organization of society. The movements anticipated the capitalist awareness of a need for a paradigm shift in production and dictated its form and nature. If the Vietnam War had not taken place, if there had not been worker and student revolts in the 1960s, if there had not been 1968 and the second wave of the women's movements, if there had not been the whole series of anti-imperialist struggles, capital would have been content to maintain its own

arrangement of power, happy to have been saved the trouble of shifting the paradigm of production! It would have been content for several good reasons: because the natural limits of development served it well; because it was threatened by the development of immaterial labor; because it knew that the transversal mobility and hybridization of world labor power opened the potential for new crises and class conflicts on an order never before experienced. The restructuring of production, from Fordism to post-Fordism, from modernization to postmodernization, was anticipated by the rise of a new subjectivity. The passage from the phase of perfecting the disciplinary regime to the successive phase of shifting the productive paradigm was driven from below, by a proletariat whose composition had already changed. Capital did not need to invent a new paradigm (even if it were capable of doing so) because the truly creative moment had already taken place. Capital's problem was rather to dominate a new composition that had already been produced autonomously and defined within a new relationship to nature and labor, a relationship of autonomous production.

At this point the disciplinary system has become completely obsolete and must be left behind. Capital must accomplish a negative mirroring and an inversion of the new quality of labor power; it must adjust itself so as to be able to command once again. We suspect that for this reason the industrial and political forces that have relied most heavily and with the most intelligence on the extreme modernization of the disciplinary productive model (such as the major elements of Japanese and East Asian capital) are the ones that will suffer most severely in this passage. The only configurations of capital able to thrive in the new world will be those that adapt to and govern the new immaterial, cooperative, communicative, and affective composition of labor power.

The Death Throes of Soviet Discipline

Now that we have given a first approximation of the conditions and forms of the new paradigm, we want to examine briefly one gigantic subjective effect that the paradigm shift determined in the course of its movement: the collapse of the Soviet system. Our thesis, which we share with many scholars of the Soviet world, is that the system went into crisis and fell apart because of its structural incapacity to go beyond the model of disciplinary governability, with respect to both its mode of production, which was Fordist and Taylorist, and its form of political command, which was Keynesian-socialist and thus simply modernizing internally and imperialist externally. This lack of flexibility in adapting its deployments of command and its